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Cornerstones of the Judicial Process
CORNERSTONES OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Jerold H. Israel
Under our federated system of govern-
ment, each state and the federal government A sm,
have their own criminal justice processes.
The federal system must comply with the of "coi
constitutional prerequisites set forth in the
Bill of Rights, and the state systems must objective
comply with those Bill of Rights' provisions
made applicable to the states by the Four-
teenth Amendment,' but those constitutional the bas
prerequisites allow considerable room for
variation from one jurisdiction to another. In and the
many respects, the fifty states and the federal
government have used that leeway to pro- l ega li4
duce considerable diversity in their respec-
tive criminal justice processes. At the same
time, however, one can readily identify cer- process i
tain common notions that run through the
fifty-one American criminaljustice processes. an(
Those notions are the subject of this article.
A small group of "cornerstone" objec-Jfeden
tives shape both the basic structure and the
governing legal principles of the process in
each state and in the federal system. Various
elements of these cornerstone objectives are mandated by the
federal constitution, but their widespread acceptance was not a
product of the Constitution. The state processes were not subject
to federal constitutional prerequisites until the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment after the civil war, but the objectives
were established long before then. Indeed, most of the corner-
stone objectives existed in the criminal justice processes of the
original states and the initial federal system, both of which
borrowed largely from English common law. Two centuries
later, the premises underlying these objectives continue to be at
the core of the American criminal justice process, notwithstand-
ing major modifications in specific proce-
group dures and in institutions of administration.
Though the cornerstone objectives them-
rstone" selves are well established, there has always
been considerable disagreement as to the
hiape both precise scope of each objective and the weight
accorded a particular objective when bal-
anced against another. These disagreements
tructure explain in large part the differences in the
content of each jurisdiction's implementa-
verning tion of the criminal justice process. The
disagreements also are reflected in the fre-
les of the quent divisions within the United States Su-
preme Court as to the interpretation of the
constitutional limitations shaped by the ob-
ach state jectives. This article does not reach those
disagreements, but concentrates on the pre-
the requisites for their analysis -- identifying the
general character of the criminal justice cor-
stem. nerstones, and identifying the major elements
of the process that reflect their general influ-
ence.
Implementing the Enforcement of the Substantive Law
Roscoe Pound noted long ago that "legal procedure is a
means, not an end; it must be made subsidiary to the substantive
law as a means of making that law effective in action."2 While
a procedure may promote values independent of the aims of
substantive law, Pound was correct in characterizing the raison
d'etre of any procedural system as accomplishing the practical
Jerold H. Israel is the Alene and Allan Smith Professor of Law at the
University of Michigan Law School and the Ed Roode Eminent
Scholar in Trial Advocacy and Procedure at the University of Florida
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implementation of the substantive law. As
applied to the criminal justice process, this As Robe
universal starting point mandates a process
that promotes effective enforcement of sub- notes,
stantive criminal law -- that is, a process
through which the government can detect, ordering
apprehend, prosecute, convict, and impose
punishment upon those who have violated
the prohibitions of substantive criminal law. live by re
However, as illustrated by the variety of
criminal justice systems throughout the world, for p
a process may be shaped in many different
ways despite the universal objective of effec- systems
tively enforcing substantive criminal law.
The choices made in implementing that ob-
jective are what distinguish one system from serve valu
another.
Initially, choices must be made among apartfro
alternative procedural structures, all of which
are designed to further effective enforcement "result
of substantive criminal law. The alternatives
reflect disagreements as to the procedures
needed to achieve effective enforcement and
the allocation of authority to administer those procedures.' The
prevailing issue in this debate is to decide which structure
achieves the best enforcement of substantive law when re-
sources allocated to that task are limited.4
A second group of choices, relating to interests independent
of effective enforcement, operate to make enforcement more
difficult to achieve. As Robert Summers notes, "in legal
ordering man does not live by results alone," for procedural
systems also seek to serve values that stand apart from achieving
"result-efficacy."5 These independent values commonly are
said to aim at achieving "fairness" in the process. While this
amorphous concept of "fairness" may have a somewhat different
connotation in different societies, its fundamental elements are
fairly uniform in democratic societies.6 Fairness imposes both
substantive and procedural norms that restrain state power in
criminal law enforcement. Substantive norms recognize such
interests as human dignity and personal autonomy, while proce-
dural norms reflect values such as community participation, a
prescribed procedure, regularity, integrity, and promptness in
application, and equality of treatment of like cases.7
Because the precise content of these independent values is
derived in large part from political ideology, tradition, and
culture, restraints imposed on the criminal justice process in
service of such values will vary from one country to the next. Yet
general agreement exists that some "fairness" restraints are
needed, even when they reduce the efficient enforcement of
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substantive criminal law through the crimi-
Summers nal justice process. For example, although it
is conceivable that the use of torture to ex-
legal tract confessions could add to the effective-
ness and efficiency of criminal law enforce-
ni does not ment, employment of torture is now univer-
sally condemned.8
The following subsections discuss the
alone, choices that have been made for the Ameri-
can criminal justice process as reflected in
Sdural the cornerstone objectives that shape it. There
are nine such objectives: (1) achieving reli-
o seek to able factfinding (i.e., discovery of the "truth");(2) utilizing an adversarial process of adjudi-
cation; (3) utilizing an accusatorial system of
that stand proof; (4) minimizing erroneous convictions;
(5) minimizing the burdens of accusation and
ichieving litigation; (6) providing for lay participation;
(7) respecting the dignity of the individual;
Ficacy. (8) maintaining the appearance of fairness;
and (9) achieving equality in administration.
While the general framework provided
by these goals is well accepted, the specifics
of their implementation are not. In part, the divisions on imple-
mentation stem from disagreement on the precise substance of
individual goals. They also stem from an ongoing controversy
concerning the precise relationship between the goals and effec-
tive enforcement of substantive criminal law. There are two
major facets of this controversy.
The first facet relates to achieving the aims of the criminal law
through its effective enforcement. The appropriate scope of
goals thought to serve that end may be assessed solely by
determining the content of the goal itself. There is no need to
balance the interests served by the goal against the societal
interest in effective enforcement of the criminal law because the
goal has been selected as a means of achieving effective enforce-
ment. The problem is that there is disagreement as to which of the
process' foundational goals, if any, are properly viewed as a
means of achieving effective criminal law enforcement. The
second facet concerns goals that are acknowledged to serve
interests that run contrary to the societal interest in effective
enforcement. Conflict resolution clearly is needed in this area,
but there is disagreement as to what is called for in resolving the
conflict.
The Aims of Effective Law Enforcement
Some commentators suggest that each of the nine objectives
noted above, at least as they are traditionally implemented,
detract from achieving effective enforcement of substantive law.
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According to these commentators, the accep-
tance of each of these goals rests upon a
balancing process in which the particular
goal outweighs the societal interest in effec-
tive law enforcement.9 The validity of this
characterization depends in large part on how
the aims of effective law enforcement are
defined.
One definitional starting point is that the
basic function of criminal law enforcement is
to repress criminal conduct, primarily through
a combination of deterrence and incapacita-
tion. Consistent with the classical utilitarian
justification for criminal law, this argument
states that effective enforcement rests on
preventing future crime, ideally by maximiz-
ing efficient use of resources. Herbert Packer,
in his classic article on the goals of the
criminal justice process,'0 explored the pro-
cedural needs of a criminal justice system
that focuses solely on efficient repression
The crime
model seeks
crime by ac
sufficiently
of apprehen
conviction
deterrenc
incapacit
of crime. Packer
compared two models of the criminal justice process, a "crime
control model" and a "due process model." The crime control
model seeks to control crime by achieving a sufficiently high rate
of apprehension and conviction through deterrence and incapaci-
tation. The due process model, in contrast, concentrates on the
fairness of the procedure and on the achievement of goals such as
respect for individual dignity and equality of treatment of indi-
viduals.
While the dichotomy drawn by Packer may have some short-
comings, it clearly illustrates the distinctions between a criminal
justice process that focuses solely upon "crime control" and a
process that considers countervailing interests in procedural
"fairness."" As Packer noted, a process aimed solely at achiev-
ing crime control could readily dispense with such goals as
providing for lay participation in adjudication or ensuring that
investigative methods are consistent with respect for individual
dignity. Indeed, Packer questioned whether such a process
would even demand a formal adjudication process or insist upon
a factfinding process as accurate as that usually thought to be
needed in the American criminal justice process.
From a perspective of crime control, Packer noted, the "infor-
mal administrative factfinding activities" of the police and pros-
ecutor should be dominant. The system must "produce a high rate
of apprehension and conviction and must do so in a context where
the magnitudes being dealt with are very large and the resources
for dealing with them are very limited." This, in turn, produces
a need for "speed and finality," which is best satisfied by relying
primarily upon the police and prosecutor and their "administra-
Spring 1993
tive expertness" in separating the innocent
control and the guilty. Of course, the crime control
objective requires that administrative
to control factfinding provide "adequate guarantees of
reliabil[ity]," but the perfect accuracy sought
by a more formal adjudication structure is notiieving a needed.'" In a process aimed at repressing
future crime, the punishment of an innocent
high rate person or the release of a guilty person can be
tolerated, provided there are not frequent
sion and mistakes. As for measuring the tolerablelevel of mistake, Packer described it this way:
through The stumbling-block is this: how much
reliability is compatible with efficiency?
e and Granted that informal factfinding will
make some mistakes that will be remedied
Sation. if backed up by adjudicative factfinding,
the desirability of providing this backup is
not affirmed or negated by factual demon-
strations or predictions that the increase in reliability will
be x percent orx plus n percent. It still remains to ask how
much weight is to be given to the competing demands of
reliability (a high degree of probability in each case that
factual guilt has been accurately determined) and effi-
ciency (a process that deals expeditiously with the large
numbers of cases that it ingests). The Criminal Control
Model is more optimistic about the improbability of error
in a significant number of cases; but it is also, though only
in part therefore, more tolerant about the amount of error
that it will put up with. The Due Process Model insists on
the prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent
possible; the Criminal Control Model accepts the prob-
ability of mistakes up to the level at which they interfere
with the goals of repressing crime, either because too
many guilty people are escaping or, more subtly, because
general awareness of the unreliability of the process leads
to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law.
In this view, reliability and efficiency are not polar oppo-
sites but rather complementary characteristics. The sys-
tem is reliable because it is efficient; reliability becomes
a matter of independent concern only when it becomes so
attenuated as to impair efficiency.3
Thus, as Packer recognized, if the aim of criminal law
enforcement is simply to achieve crime control, then the goal of
obtaining reliable factfinding is consistent with, and need not be
balanced against, the implementation of substantive criminal
law. As Packer also points out, however, this perspective of the
7
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reliability goal has distinct limits. The criminal justice process
can implement the goal of reliable factfinding in a manner
inconsistent with effective crime control. This occurs if (1) the
process requires an additional quantum of reliability beyond that
necessary to regulate crime control and does so inefficiently
(e.g., through the unnecessary use of scarce resources), or (2) the
procedures utilized provide the appropriate level of reliability,
but can be replaced by other sufficiently reliable procedures that
expend fewer resources (or, arguably, the same expenditure at a
more rapid pace).
Interestingly, if the purpose of substantive criminal law is
perceived to be retribution rather than crime control, then a
broader range of basic process goals are consistent with the
implementation of substantive law. If the primary function of
criminal law is to ensure that those who transgress the basic
community norms of the criminal law receive their "just des-
serts," and effective law enforcement is judged in reference to
that end, then reliable factfinding is not only a consistent goal,
but a goal that has no limits. From this perspective, the process
fails if an innocent person is punished or a guilty person is not
punished. Complete truthfinding becomes an essential element
of the process, and all structural choices aimed at making the
process more effective in discovering the truth are consistent
with effective implementation of substantive criminal law.
Thus, from a "just desserts" perspective, if an adversarial
system of adjudication provides the most accurate means of
determining the truth, then adversarial adju-
dication also implements, rather than de-
tracts from, the underlying process objec- [ 4T h e re
tive of achieving effective law enforcement.
Because substantive criminal law rests upon
a moral evaluation of the actor's culpability Of effe
and because criminal statutes often defer to
community judgments rather than precisely enforcem,
define culpability, the participation of lay
persons in the adjudication of guilt or inno- eliminat
cence is consistent with the aims of the
substantive law. 4 The process goal of avoid-
ing the imposition of undue burdens on the between
accused is also consistent with the substan-
tive law under a just desserts approach, at effective t
least insofar as it reduces the burdens im-
posed upon the innocent accused. 5  Of and other
course, the retributive view of effective law
enforcement does not eliminate conflicts
between achieving effective enforcement America
and other goals of the American criminal
justice process. Those process goals that justice
impair the process' ability to determine the
truth are inconsistent with imposingjust desserts upon the guilty.
Their acceptance, under this view of the aims of the criminal law,
can be explained only as the result of a choice that gave them
priority over the objective of achieving effective law enforce-
ment.
A few commentators advance a long-term instrumentalist
view of the aims of criminal law that would render even the truth-
deflecting goals of the criminal process consistent with the
effective implementation of substantive criminal law.' 6 Accord-
ing to this view, the effective enforcement of criminal law
necessarily includes an element of moral education. 7 Criminal
law can be an effective deterrent only if it persuades and educates
the public as to its underlying values, including respect for
individual dignity and autonomy. The moral force of criminal
law is undermined, however, if the enforcement process fails to
recognize those same values. Like criminal law itself, the
criminal justice process must reflect the basic lesson that "the
ends do notjustify the means."'" To gain the public's acceptance
of the moral values of substantive criminal law, the process must
demonstrate the legitimacy of the results of its enforcement.
Proponents believe this can be achieved only through an enforce-
ment process that convinces the public of its "fairness." Indeed,
they argue the same conclusion follows from an even narrower
perspective that focuses solely upon the successful apprehension
and conviction of offenders. The key to this success depends
predominantly upon public cooperation which rests on the public's
acceptance of the fairness of the process. 9
Commentators and courts generally re-
ject such a long-range instrumentalist view oflive view the relationship between substantive law and
procedure. These critics regard cornerstone
e law objectives that impair the discovery of the
truth to be inconsistent with the achievement
does not of effective enforcement of substantive crimi-
nal law. 0 Acceptance of these competing
onficts goals is based on a determination that they
outweigh society's interest in effective en-
forcement of criminal law. Accordingly, a
iieving lawmaker must determine what content should
be given to those goals by examining the
orcement nature of the process used to reach that deter-
mination.
ls of the Resolving Conflicts
When a cornerstone objective is in con-
riminal flict with the core process function of achiev-
ing effective law enforcement, the question
ocess. arises as to how that conflict was resolved and
the objective justified notwithstanding the
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
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sacrifice in effective enforcement. The answer to this question
can have an important bearing on how a lawmaker approaches a
decision to adopt or reject a procedural limitation which would
serve a cornerstone objective, but only at the expense of effective
enforcement. Two different approaches to the resolution of the
conflict have been suggested. One is a utilitarian cost-benefit
balancing approach that reduces the interests in conflict to a
common denominator and weighs the costs and benefits of a
particular limitation (empirically established where possible)
against the common denominator. The second approach gives
priority to values essential for fairness and allows for the weigh-
ing of the negative effects on enforcement only when a particular
limitation does not truly rest on the basic fairness concern
underlying a cornerstone objective.
The utilitarian cost-benefit balancing approach starts from the
premise that the same basic societal concerns underlie both
effective law enforcement and those cornerstone objectives that
operate as a counterpoint to effective enforcement. The counter-
point goals seek to preserve individual freedoms by restricting
government authority to procedures that comply with norms of
"fairness." Effective law enforcement also seeks to protect
against invasions of freedom, although the approach contem-
plates invasions not by the government, but by criminals.2' Thus,
both effective law enforcement and counterpoint process goals
deal with the same common denominator: the preservation of
individual freedom. This common foundation provides a single
measure for evaluating legal standards that contribute to one
value but detract from another.2 Ultimately, the conflict is not
between two inherently contradictory concerns of "crime con-
trol" versus "individual liberty," but between two different
modes of protecting individual liberty.23
In determining whether a process limita-
tion should be imposed upon government
under a cost-benefit approach, a lawmaker Some co
must determine what measure of individual
freedom would be gained by imposing a maintain
limitation and balance that gain against the
measure of individual freedom that would
be lost as a result of the limitation's impair- primarily
ment of effective law enforcement. Indeed,
the lawmaker arguably can adopt a more social ills
generalized cost-benefit analysis, as sug-
gested by the philosopher Sydney Hook in only
discussing the rising crime rate of the 1970s:
I submit that at the present juncture of crime is to
events, because our American cities have
become more dangerous to life and limb root sol
than the darkest jungle, we must give
priority to the rights of potential victims. I am prepared to
weaken the guarantees and privileges to which I am
entitled as a potential criminal, or as a defendant, in order
to strengthen my rights and safeguards as a potential
victim. Purely on the basis of probabilities, I am con-
vinced that I run a greater danger of suffering disaster as
a potential victim than as a potential criminal or defendant.
It is these probabilities that shift from one historical period
to another that must be the guide of wise, prudent, and just
administration of law.24
Application of a cost-benefit analysis requires a series of
empirical judgments that are likely to be the subject of consider-
able disagreement. Initially, one must evaluate the threat to
individual liberty posed by crime. Because crime has always
been considered a serious problem in this country, the focus in
this evaluation is on the increasing severity of the threat to our
collective security. This threat is reflected in increasing rates of
victimization and decreasing clearance rates, particularly as to
violent crimes.2" If the evaluation shows a significant increase in
the threat of crime, it must then be determined whether more
effective law enforcement will significantly reduce the severity
of that threat.
Some commentators maintain that crime is primarily a prod-
uct of social ills and that the only means of reducing crime is to
attack these root social causes.26 They contend that more
effective law enforcement will have only a minor impact upon
the rate or nature of crime.27 Others argue that more effective law
enforcement can significantly reduce (or at least slow the growth
of) general or particular types of criminal activity.28 If one
concludes that more effective enforcement significantly reduces
crime, the question then becomes whether
change in the process itself can contribute
lentators substantially to increased effectiveness or
whether the key to effectiveness is the quan-
tity and quality of the resources devoted to
:t crime is the enforcement task. 29
Assuming that process changes can have
roduct Of considerable impact, conflict may arise in
assessing the influence of a particular proce-
d that the dural change in achieving more effective
enforcement. This, in turn, leads to what is
probably the most difficult inquiry in this
analysis: judging the impact upon indi-
vidual liberty when altering the restrictions
tack these imposed upon government. With this pre-
liminary analysis completed, the lawmaker
causes. then turns to the final task of balancing the
costs and benefits of the particular change as
Spring 1993
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it bears upon individual liberty.
Although the application of a cost-ben- All liberty
efit analysis is filled with uncertainties, its
proponents argue that the inquiry is worth a totalita
the effort. Though the lawmaker is likely to
find few choices that are incontrovertible, and the n
the inquiry should produce distinctions in
degree and identify those balances that are
more readily drawn than others. Proponents criminaljt
also reject the contention that the "politics of
crime" will inevitably convert the cost-ben- has been ai
efit analysis into a tool to reduce restrictions
upon police and prosecutors.30 Indeed, they the establ
suggest that the inquiry required for such an
analysis may well serve to fortify basic lib-
erties against political pressures. As Alfred perpet
Conard stated: "Every human value is bought
at the price of some other human value, and such
we are destined to squander our patrimony
of liberties, like spendthrift heirs, unless we
find out what we are giving for what we are getting."3
An alternative approach to justifying cornerstone objectives
that detract from enforcement efficiency largely rejects balanc-
ing. This approach sees the loss of liberty through criminal
victimization or through governmental action as different in
character and significance. As a result, these interests cannot be
weighed appropriately against one another.32 Proponents of this
view argue that a choice in values must be made and, for several
reasons, protection against misuse of governmental authority
must be given the higher priority. They note that "[t]he basic
political problem of a free society is the problem of controlling
the public monopoly of force."33 All liberty is lost under a
totalitarian regime and the misuse of the criminal justice process
has been a basic tool in the establishment and perpetuation of
such regimes.34 Accordingly, the paramount goal of the criminal
justice process is to serve as a bulwark against governmental
oppression.3" The government cannot be allowed to subvert the
dignity of individual criminals even though the criminal may
harm his victim's dignity. Failure in this regard will carryover
to other aspects of governmental regulation and threaten the
democratic fiber of government. As Justice Holmes noted, the
criminal justice process must be guided by the principle that "it
is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble role."36
With priority automatically given to guarding against govern-
mental abuse of the criminal justice process, adherents to the
above position argue that the critical determination for the
lawmaker lies not in balancing a safeguarding cornerstone objec-
tive against effective enforcement, but in assessing the relation-
is
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ship of a particular governmental practice toost under the underlying concern of that objective. If
a practice is deemed to violate a safeguard-
i regime ing objective, then it should not be allowed
as part of the criminal justice process, re-
se of the gardless of its positive impact upon the ef-
fective enforcement of substantive law.
Conversely, if a practice does not undercut a
ce process safeguarding objective, then balancing is
appropriate to maximize efficiency (i.e., in
'sic tool in determining whether resources expended
through the practice are justified by its en-
ment and forcement results).Of course, the sticking point under this
analysis is the determination of whether a
ion particular practice runs counter to a safe-
guarding objective, thereby placing it be-
imes. yond the realm of utilitarian balancing. The
first step is to identify general principles of
fairness, derived from historical traditions
and widely shared values of a democratic society, that underlie
those cornerstone objectives which are designed to safeguard
against government abuse. The second step is to assess the
particular procedure in light of those principles. Proponents
argue that while there is room for disagreement among reason-
able persons, particularly as to the second inquiry, such defini-
tional ambiguity is less dangerous than a general application of
utilitarian balancing. The symbolic placement of safeguards
against governmental abuse beyond the realm of balancing
ensures, as Justice Brandeis agreed, that "fundamentals" must
prevail "no matter the ends."37
As an illustration of this approach, consider the question of
whether police may follow a practice of using undercover agents
to befriend and then exploit suspects to obtain damaging admis-
sions. Some decisionmakers might conclude that such deception
by the government poses an unacceptable threat to liberty be-
cause of its chilling effect on the individual's right of association.
For others, the government's use of such deception is acceptable
because it poses no greater threat than similar deceptions inher-
ent in all personal relationships. A "friend" who turns out to be
a government agent is no worse than any other supposed "friend"
who turns out to be disloyal. A third position, falling somewhere
in the middle, suggests that governmental "planting" of a friend
compares to a search for criminal evidence. Such government
actions, therefore, should be accepted only on conditions tradi-
tionally applied to searches (i.e., upon the basis of probable cause
and, possibly, the approval of a magistrate).
The key from the perspective of opponents of general utilitar-
ian balancing is that each of these positions is based upon an
HeinOnline  -- 2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 10 1992-1993
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analysis of the threat posed by the practice to
the individual's dignity. Unlike general
utilitarian balancing, the inquiry is not based
on the weighing of such factors as the seri-
ousness of the threat of crime in general or of
a particular crime being investigated, the
effectiveness of governmental deception in
solving crimes, the comparative effective-
ness of alternative modes of investigation
that are less threatening to individual pri-
vacy, or the capacity of the community to
exercise control over the police through
means other than legal regulation of this
practice. Admittedly, for some lawmakers,
these considerations may slide in at the edges
in assessing the character of the practice as
it relates to general principles of fairness, but
the critical distinction is that they do not
become controlling elements in determining
what governmental practices are acceptable.38
THE NINE CORNERSTONES
Discovery of the Truth
Depending upon how one views the goal of substantive
criminal law, discovery of the truth can be characterized as either
indispensable to the enforcement of the substantive law or as
largely necessary to achieving that end.39 When one focuses on
fair treatment of the accused, discovery of the truth remains an
important goal insofar as it serves to protect the innocent defen-
dant against false conviction. Accordingly, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court has described the discovery of the truth
as a "fundamental goal" of the criminal justice system4' and the
"central purpose of a criminal trial."42 Lower courts and com-
mentators regularly echo such characterizations. 3
Several commentators, however, question the truthseeking
goal on epistemological grounds.4 4 They note that while
truthfinding is commonly described as aimed at serving "the dual
aim of our criminal justice system ... that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer,' 45 the determination of guilt or innocence
relies on more than the discovery of the truth of historically
objective facts. It also involves application of "normative judg-
ments" measured by such mens rea elements as recklessness and
negligence and by assessing such justifications as self-defense
and duress.46 Some argue that even as to historical fact, the search
for truth is fruitless because "the truth concerning any given prior
event is unknowable" and the findings of fact are in reality
"educated guesses. ' 47 These objections, however, do not pre-
clude a goal of ensuring that the determination as to guilt or
Spring 1993
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innocent is made as reliably as possible. 48 It
cuses on is in this regard that truthfinding becomes a
basic goal of the process. Focusing prima-
Fit of the rily on historical fact, it seeks to create afactfinding process that can minimize errors
in the enforcement of criminal law.4 9
covery of Various elements of the criminal justice
process specifically promote such discovery
nains an of the truth. Initially, the process tries to
provide an investigatory capacity to uncover
t goal both the commission of crime and the iden-
tity of the offender. It seeks to provide
police and prosecutors with the authority to
serves to identify potential sources of information and
to obtain evidence even when the sources are
nnocent not cooperative. The police, therefore, are
allowed, subject to certain limitations, to
7gainst question possible witnesses and suspects, to
search persons and property, to require sus-
pects to participate in identification proce-iction. dures, and to utilize informers and under-
cover agents. Prosecutors are granted inves-
tigative authority that is even broader in
some respects than that of police through the use of the investi-
gative grand jury.
Discovery of the truth also requires an adjudication process
that is reliable both in the convicting the guilty defendant and
exonerating the defendant who is erroneously accused. Trial
aspects aimed at ensuring the reliability of the adjudication
process include the trial's adversary structure, prohibitions
against certain deceptive adversarial actions, evidentiary rules
promoting the production of reliable evidence, legal standards
designed to eliminate biased jurors and judges, and restrictions
limiting the scope of issues in a single trial to prevent confusing
the factfinder. Various pretrial procedures, such as discovery of
the opponent's evidence, bolster the capacity of the trial to
produce a reliable verdict.5 0 Legal restrictions upon adjudica-
tion through a guilty plea also serve to ensure the reliability of
convictions produced by that process.
Despite its importance, the truthfinding objective of the
criminal justice process is, in certain respects, sacrificed for the
benefit of other values. As one court put it: "[T]ruth, like all
other good things, may be loved unwisely -- may be pursued too
keenly -- may cost too much."'" Consequently, there comes a
point at which factfinding precision must give way to other
values that are truth deflecting. As discussed earlier, there is
considerable disagreement as to how truth-deflecting values
should be weighed against truthfinding. All agree, however, that
the commitment to other values will sometimes prevail.
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Most of the values prevailing over the truthfinding function
relate to substantive norms of "fairness," such as the preserva-
tion of human dignity and personal autonomy. Some values give
rise to legal norms that operate to prevent the discovery of
reliable, relevant evidence. For example, the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the state from compelling a defendant to give self-
incriminating testimony and the Fourth Amendment bars unrea-
sonable searches and seizures by the state and prohibits the use
of illegally obtained evidence.5 1 Other fairness standards bar
criminal convictions despite ample evidence of guilt that was
properly obtained. For example, the Fifth Amendment's double
jeopardy prohibition and Sixth Amendment's speedy trial re-
quirement may bar convictions even though a retrial or delay
casts no doubt upon the accuracy of the conviction.5 1
Although truth-deflecting values commonly operate to ben-
efit the defendant, that is not always the case. Respect for such
values also may operate to keep the defendant from obtaining
exculpatory testimony or evidence. This usually arises where a
witness is excused from testifying because of the exercise of a
privilege.
Another factor sometimes balanced against the truthseeking
function is the limitation of available admin-
istrative resources. In mostjurisdictions, the
criminal justice process is burdened with
heavy caseloads. These pressures are re- Altho
duced by broad discretion of law enforce-
ment agencies to allocate their efforts ac- deflecti
cording to the significance of the offense
and the likelihood of a successful investiga- common
tion and prosecution. The end result, how-
ever, is that at least some guilty parties may
escape detection. Limited resources also benefit th
may preclude a full investigation, by both
prosecution and defense, in cases that are that is no
prosecuted. Neither side may have the re-
sources to explore problematic avenues that case. R
could conceivably produce relevant evi-
dence.
Some commentators suggest that even such valt
basic truthfinding safeguards in the adjudi-
cation processes are weakened by caseload operate
pressures. These pressures play a significant
role in shaping the law governing subjectsefen
such as plea bargaining, the joint trial of
offenders, and the provision of appointed
counsel in misdemeanor cases. Arguably, obtaining
the law does not do all it could to ensure the
reliability of adjudications. 54 testimony
Adversary Adjudication
The American criminal justice process is structured to pro-
vide adversarial proceedings for adjudicating guilt. Although
courts sometimes attribute characteristics of an accusatorial
system to the concept of adversarial adjudication,55 the key to an
adversary system is the division of responsibilities between the
decisionmaker and the parties.
An adversarial system vests decisionmaking authority, both
as to law and fact, in a neutral decisionmaker rendering a decision
in light of the materials presented by the parties. In an adversarial
criminal proceeding, there often will be two such neutral
decisionmakers, the jury (as to factual issues) and the judge (as
to legal issues). The decisionmaker in a pure adversary system
operates as "a generally silent referee, determining the case as it
is presented, and leaving it very much to the parties to choose the
battleground."56 The adversarial parties are the state and the
defendant. The adversarial model gives to the parties the
responsibility of investigating the facts, interviewing possible
witnesses, consulting possible experts, and determining what
will or will not be told. Each party is expected to present the facts
and interpret the law in the light most favorable to its side and,
through counter-argument and cross-exami-
nation, to challenge the soundness of the
presentations made by the other side. Thetruth- judge and jury then impartially adjudicate
the issues raised by the parties.
values The American criminal justice process
actually seeks a "modified" or "regulated"
perate to adversary system as opposed to the "pure"
adversary model described above. It does
not provide for a totally silent or inactive
efendant, judge; it imposes limits upon counsel de-
signed to prohibit "excesses" in adversary
!ways the presentations; and it imposes a duty on one
party to assist the other in gathering infor-
fo mation under certain circumstances. 7 Even
with these controls, the American criminal
justice process remains sufficiently
also may adversarial in its overall character and stands
in sharp contrast to the "inquisitorial" or
Seep the "nonadversary" systems prevailing in conti-
nental Europe. Under European systems,
Sfroim the responsibility for the initial development
of relevant facts lies with ajudicial officer or
a prosecutor who collects all relevant evi-
culpatory dence (both incriminating and exculpatory)
in a comprehensive dossier and brings
evidence, charges against the suspect if that evidence
establishes a likelihood of guilt." Once the
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
rgh
ing
led
t a
esp
'es
tok
Ian
ex
or
HeinOnline  -- 2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 12 1992-1993
Cornerstones of the Judicial Process
accusation is filed, the trial court assumes responsibility for the
continued development of the case and the presentation of
evidence, including a predominant role in questioning wit-
nesses. 9 Although the prosecutor and defense counsel have an
opportunity to contribute, their role is far more limited than the
role of counsel in the American trial. 60
The American adversarial system is adopted from the English
common law. Why the English developed an adversarial, rather
than an inquisitorial, system of adjudication remains a matter of
considerable speculation. Some commentators suggest that the
adversarial system is an outgrowth of theological concepts,
reflected previously in the practices of compurgation and trial by
battle.6 Others view it as a logical extension of different aspects
of English criminal procedure, such as trial by jury and the
practice of private prosecution.61 Still others see the influence of
the same concerns for individualism and competitiveness that
prevailed in the establishment of the free enterprise system. 63
Today, only the latter thesis plays a significant role in the
common understanding of the grounding for the adversarial
character of the American criminal justice process. Adversarial
adjudication is supported on two grounds: (1) as the system of
adjudication most likely to produce accurate verdicts, and (2) as
a system that respects individual autonomy and reflects the
proper relationship between the individual and the state.'
The Truthfinding Justification
The superiority of the adversarial process
in producing accurate verdicts rests on two
premises. First, it is argued that self-inter-
ested adversaries will uncover and present
more useful information to the decisionmaker
than would be developed by the judicial
officer in an inquisitorial system. The self-
interests of the parties will ensure that all
relevant evidence is produced. As each side
challenges the soundness of the opposing
party's case, the strengths and weaknesses
of the evidence are fully explored.65 Second,
it is argued that the adversarial system pre-
cludes biased decisionmakers who are more
likely to exist in inquisitorial proceedings.
Because decisionmakers in the adversarial
system are not themselves involved in the
development of the facts, they are more
likely to approach the evidence at trial in a
disinterested fashion and withhold judgment
until the case is fully explored. 66 It is said
that an adversarial presentation is the "only
effective means for combatting [the] natural
Spring 1993
human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that
which is not fully known. 67
While both of the above premises are subject to challenge,
critics of the adversarial system focus primarily on the first
premise, that partisan advocacy on both sides will enhance the
discovery of all relevant information. Critics contend that
adversaries have incentive to suppress and distort evidence,
utilize surprise to ambush their opponents, and cajole and intimi-
date witnesses. 68 Thus, the critics conclude that adversaries' self-
interests lead to the suppression of relevant information and
attempts to deceive the decisionmaker.
Most critics acknowledge that the adversarial system, coupled
with appropriate regulation to curb such excesses, might well
deliver on the claim that it provides the "best means of ascertain-
ing truth."69 Critics contend, however, that the American crimi-
nal justice process falls far short of providing that regulation.70
The American process is said to permit regular use of "devices
of adversarial litigation... [that] are not geared for, but are often
aptly suited to defeat the development of the truth."'7 Further,
critics argue that the adversarial ethos, particularly defense
counsel's overriding obligation to his or her client, naturally
fosters an incentive "to win at all costs. ' 72 To combat this
inclination and make truth "paramount" requires substantially
more than the limited and loosely formulated restraints currently
imposed upon deception and obfuscation.
Critics of the traditional adversarial system offer a variety of
proposals to place greater emphasis upon its
truthseeking function. In large part, how-
ever, these proposals have met with consid-
erable resistance. While there is widespread
support for the proposition that the
prosecution's responsibility in an adversarial
system is to "do justice" rather than "gain
victory,"73 considerable disagreement exists
as to the types of restraints to place on
prosecutors to ensure adherence to that re-
sponsibility.7 4 There is similar disagree-
ment over limits to place on defense counsel
in advancing the client's cause.75 Some
argue that restraints designed to preclude
misleading the decisionmaker undermine
the truthseeking function of the adversarial
system in the long run because they chill
client willingness to confide in the attorney7 6
Further, disagreements exist as to whether
certain obligations imposed upon both sides
(e.g., providing pretrial discovery to the
opponent) detract from or add to the effec-
tiveness of the adversarial system's truth-
U
An adversarial
presentation, it is said,
is the "only effective
means for combatting
[the] natural human
tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the
familiar that which is
not fully known."
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seeking function. Finally, rules of the
adversarial system that, to some, seem to [Slome a
encourage adversary excesses are seen by
others as serving independent values of the adversar
criminal justice process that override the
search for the truth. 77  "Misde
A second criticism of the truthfinding
capacity of the adversarial system focuses
on the premise that each side will have the search fo
equal capacity to challenge the other. Critics
argue that there is a serious imbalance in the and that
resources available to each side.78 They
note, in particular, that the "[s]tate has in the
police an agency for the discovery of evi- justtficati
dence superior to anything which even the
wealthiest defendant could employ."79 These only tri
critics see many of the accused's truth-
deflecting constitutional rights as a method for d
of redressing this resource imbalance by
giving added protection to the "weaker
party."80 They argue further that the expan- adversa
sive interpretation of these rights is essential
to serving this purpose. The need to com- than in
pensate for the defense's comparative weak-
ness is also cited as justification for other adju
procedural obligations imposed upon the
prosecution, such as pleading requirements
that narrowly frame the state's case,8' and a prosecutorial duty
to assist the defense in gaining access to key information.82
Many such claims for "compensatory" procedural restrictions
are challenged as ignoring the underlying truthseeking function
of the adversarial system and promoting, instead, what Roscoe
Pound described as the "sporting theory" of adversarial adjudi-
cation. This theory characterizes adversarial adjudication as a
sporting battle between two contestants, each given an equal
chance of winning as they take the field, with victory awarded to
the side that displays superior skills.83 As Pound and others have
argued, that is not the objective of the adversarial trial and should
not be the perspective from which the criminal justice process is
evaluated.84 Succinctly summarizing this objection, Joseph
Grano stated:
The belief that prosecution should be made difficult for its
own sake can be premised only on the view that a criminal
trial is analogous to a. . . boxing match, in which we are
indifferent about the outcome. ... Such indifference is
inappropriate in the administration of criminal justice: if
a defendant is guilty, he should be convicted; if he is
innocent, he should be acquitted. We may tolerate an
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erroneous acquittal that stems from an
e that the effort to protect the innocent or from an
effort to protect human dignity, but when
system is these concerns are not evident, an erro-
neous acquittal should be a source of
ed as a substantial dismay, not indifference.
85
According to this line of analysis, the de-
e truth," fense may be given special protection, based
on the cornerstone values of the process,
ernative such as the furthering of the accurate
truthfinding and protecting the dignity of
offer tthe individual. An imbalance in resourcesthe is not, however, a concern as such; the
function of the adversarial system is con-
upport sidered to be served adequately if the de-
fense has sufficient resources to success-
se of fully challenge an erroneous prosecution.
Other Justifications
r rather Although courts tend to stress the
truthfinding justification for the adversarial
sitorial system, commentators often stress other
values of adversarial adjudication.86 In-
tion. deed, some argue that the adversarial sys-
tem is "misdescribed as a search for the
truth," and that alternative justifications
offer the only true support for the use of adversarial rather than
inquisitorial adjudication.87
One such alternative justification values the adversarial sys-
tem for its views of the defendant as an individual. Consistent
with the premise that the individual is the source of the
government's sovereignty, the adversarial system treats the
defendant as an equal to the prosecution. As Thurmond Arnold
noted:
When a great government treats the lowliest of criminals
as an equal antagonist, strips itself of the executive power
which it possesses, and submits the case to twelve ordinary
men, allowing the judge only the authority of an umpire,
we have a gesture of recognition to the dignity of the
individual which has an extraordinary dramatic appeal.88
The adversarial system also respects individual autonomy in its
commitment to the individual's control over the "basic mode of
his participation in the adjudicatory process."89 The defendant
may play an active role in his own defense. Indeed, he may
decide to forego his defense and plead guilty. As noted by the
Supreme Court, the adversarial system recognizes the "inesti-
HeinOnline  -- 2 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 14 1992-1993
Cornerstones of the Judicial Process
mable worth of free choices." 90 This, in turn,
increases the defendant's level of confidence The hear2
in the process and acceptance of even ad-
verse results.' plea ba
The adversarial system also is justified as
the system best suited to vindicate the rights particulad
granted to the defendant in the interest of
procedural "fairness." This "rights theory"
of adversarial adjudication holds that the as cre
"adversar[ial] system is inspired by an atti-
tude of distrust of public officials and its enorn
complementary demand for safeguards
against abuse."92  Accordingly, the between
adversarial system rejects the hierarchial
model of an inquisitorial process in favor of
a coordinate model that sharply divides au- of the
thority and places an adversarial check on
the decisionmaker. It provides the defen- system
dant with a "champion" (the defense coun-
sel) and, in aligning that champion solely "reality r
with the client, creates a strong incentive to
take full advantage of all the protections the
law offers to the defense. justice
The combined justifications for the
adversarial system resulted in its extension
to various stages in the criminal justice process. As originally
adopted in this country, the concept of adversarial adjudication
applied to the criminal trial alone. Thus, the Sixth Amendment's
guarantees of assistance of counsel, confrontation of opposing
witnesses, compulsory process, and notice of charges contem-
plated trial.93 Gradually, however, the reach of the adversarial
system was extended. Courts and legislatures recognized that
effective advocacy required the creation of pretrial rights, such
as the right to pretrial discovery of at least part of the opponent's
case.94 The role of defense counsel in protecting the accused's
rights was also extended to pretrial proceedings in which the state
seeks to obtain evidence from the accused.95 Indeed, in some
jurisdictions, legislatures even extended the adversarial process
to the grand jury, the historical bastion of inquisitorial inquiry,
by allowing target witnesses to be accompanied by counsel when
testifying before the grand jury.96
The adversarial system has also been carried over to pretrial
screening. Most states now use the adversarial preliminary
hearing either in addition to or as a substitute for the nonadversarial
screening by the grand jury.97 Hearings affecting the pretrial
status of the accused, such as incompetency hearings and preven-
tive detention hearings, also use what essentially amounts to an
adversarial process. 98 In the post-trial stages, adversarial adjudi-
cation is now employed in certain aspects of sentencing, in parole
Spring 1993
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hearings, and in probation revocation pro-
,liance on ceedings. 99
Although the adversarial system has been
tins, in extended to other stages in the criminaljustice process, the trial clearly remains the
criticized centerpiece for adversarial adjudication.Thus, it is not surprising that commentators
speak of a "decline" in the adversarial sys-
ng an tem due to the small percentage of final
adjudications produced by trials. 0° In nearly
s gap all jurisdictions, the vast majority of charges
are disposed of by dismissals on motion of
e "ieal the prosecution or by guilty pleas.' Theheavy reliance on plea bargains, in particu-
lar, is criticized as creating an enormous gap
'rsarial between the "ideal of the adversarial sys-
tem" and the "reality" of criminal justice
nd the practice. Whether this is the case, however,
depends upon how plea bargaining is con-
criminal ducted. Though plea bargaining may have
certain inherent flaws,' it is not necessarily
inconsistent with the premises of adversarial
actice. adjudication. The concept of party control
over the direction of the litigation necessar-
ily includes the authority of the parties to
resolve their dispute through settlement.I Of course, a settle-
ment will not be consistent with the adversarial system if the
defendant is coerced or is denied in the negotiation process the
same zealous representation by counsel that would be available
at trial. Whether these prerequisites are commonly met in plea
bargaining is subject to question. Where they are met, however,
the acceptance by both parties arguably produces a result as
consistent with the objectives of the adversarial system (includ-
ing its truthfinding function) as the trial."°
Accusatorial Burdens
The American criminal justice process is designed to be
accusatorial as well as adversarial. The concepts of adversarial
adjudication and accusatorial procedure complement each other,
but are not virtual equivalents.' 5 An accusatorial procedure
requires the government to bear the burden of establishing the
guilt of the accused, as opposed to requiring the accused to bear
the burden of establishing his innocence. As the Supreme Court
noted, an accusatorial system requires the "government in its
contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load."'0 6 The
prosecution must produce sufficient evidence to convince the
trier of fact of the accused's guilt, and it must do so with
"evidence independently and freely secured," without compel-
ling the accused to assist in this prosecution responsibility. 10 7
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Although England's adoption of an accusatorial system prob-
ably grew out of the early English view of the criminal prosecu-
tion as a victim's private action seeking personal redress, the
modern accusatorial system is justified on grounds consistent
with the recognition of crimes as public wrongs, with prosecu-
tions brought by the state on behalf of the community as a whole.
Foremost among these grounds is the view that criminal sanc-
tions are so severe that extra care must be taken to ensure they are
not imposed upon innocent persons. 08 Also involved is a distrust
of governmental authority based on a recognition that public
officials may seek to invoke the criminal justice machinery to
serve their own ends, rather than to protect the public.°9 Some
argue that the accusatorial process also responds to a governmen-
tal capacity to gather and preserve evidence that far exceeds the
capacity of the defense."0
The accusatorial character of the criminal justice process is
revealed in various elements of the process, including placing
upon the government the ultimate burden of persuasion and the
burden of going forward with the introduction of evidence, the
presumption of the defendant's innocence, and the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination."' Requiring the govern-
ment to make the initial presentation of
evidence strengthens the safeguard against
wrongful conviction and ensures that the
government carries the central burden of the Requi
litigation. It gives to the accused the right
"to remain inactive and secure, until the gover
prosecution has taken up its burden and
produced evidence and effected persua- make t
sion."'' If the prosecution fails in its case-
in-chief to establish a prima facie case for
conviction, the defense is entitled to a di- presen
rected acquittal without ever producing its
own evidence. Additionally, by requiring evidence
the state to establish the defendant's guilt,
the accusatorial system assigns to the state the safegi
the burden of bearing the "margin of error"
in factfinding." 3
The presumption of innocence, while of- wrongfui
ten characterized as a mere restatement of
the allocation of the burden of persuasion, and ensu
conveys a special admonition that also
strengthens the accusatorial nature of the
process. When the jury is informed of the governm
presumption, it is told, in effect, "to judge an
accused's guilt or innocence solely on the the cent
evidence adduced at trial and not on the basis
of suspicions that may arise from the fact of of the
his arrest, indictment, or custody."' 1" It may
well be "known to every intelligent person that the vast majority
of accused persons are guilty,"'"I5 but the presumption of inno-
cence prohibits the jury from relying on any such general
confidence in the police and prosecutor in reaching its decision.
Finally, the privilege against self-incrimination serves the
prong of the accusatory process that forces the government to
establish its case using its own resources." 16 It prohibits the state
from easing its burden of proof simply by calling the defendant
as its witness and forcing him to make the prosecution's case or
by compelling a confession prior to trial.
As with other basic themes reflected in the criminal justice
process, the accusatorial mode of shifting burdens to the state is
subject to limitations. Thus, American jurisdictions commonly
impose upon the defense the burden of initially introducing
evidence of "defenses" that could relieve the defendant of
liability." 7 Many jurisdictions go further by placing on the
defendant the ultimate burden of persuasion as to those defenses
that do not negate elements of the crime." 8 The defendant may
also bear the burden of establishing that he is incompetent to
stand trial or that adverse evidence was obtained illegally and is
therefore inadmissible.' '9 The principle that the state establish its
case independently, without the accused's
assistance, is confined largely to the histori-
cal and constitutional prohibition against theg the state's use of "coercion [to] prove its charge
against an accused out of his own mouth," as
?nt to reflected in the self-incrimination privi-
lege. 20 The accusatorial system does not
nitial prevent the state from offering the accused
an opportunity to confess guilt or even using
certain types of deception or encouragement
on of to acquire confessions. Nor does it bar using
the accused's person in obtaining identifica-
;ngthens tion evidence or taking evidence from his
possession by search and seizure. Although
i against all of these investigative procedures involve,to some extent, the assistance of the accused,
they are accepted as consistent with the basic
nviction tenets of an accusatorial process.'
that the Minimizing Erroneous Convictions
Protecting the innocent from erroneous
carries conviction is an important goal of the crimi-
nal justice process. Indeed, many argue that
this goal is of the highest priority. 22 Whereburden a conflict exists between protecting the in-
nocent and other objectives of the criminal
'ation. justice system, protection of the innocent
almost always prevails.
23
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Although the goal of minimizing erroneous convictions is
closely tied to the truthfinding function of the process, it extends
substantially beyond that function. Reliable factfinding, as a
goal in itself, seeks to ensure the accuracy of both guilty verdicts
and acquittals.'24 Protecting the innocent, however, places
greater priority on the accuracy of the guilty verdict. It seeks to
minimize the risk of convicting an innocent person even if it
increases the chance that a guilty person may escape convic-
tion.'25 Accordingly, while the Supreme Court stated that "the
basic purpose of the trial is the determination of the truth,"'' 2 6 it
also noted that impairment of the trial's "truthfinding function"
is of primary concern where "serious questions [are raised] about
the accuracy of guilty verdicts."' 27 For, as the Court also ob-
served, it is "a fundamental value determination of our system
... that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a
guilty man go free."' 28
The goal of minimizing the risk of an erroneous conviction is
advanced by the various rules designed to ensure factfinding
accuracy. Most of these rules apply in an even-handed fashion.
Rules excluding evidence that is unreliable or likely to be given
too much weight by thejury commonly apply to both prosecution
and defense.'29 Also, both sides can challenge the impartiality of
jurors or judges. 3 ° Other standards relating to factfinding
accuracy, however, are aimed specifically at protecting the
innocent accused. Thus, the prosecution is required to disclose
material exculpatory evidence within its possession or control. "'
Similarly, the defendant's right to a face-to-face confrontation
with opposing witnesses partially rests on the premise that such
a confrontation "reduc[es] the risk that a witness will wrongfully
implicate an innocent person."' 32 Protection of innocence also
underlies special rules that give the defendant-witness greater
protection when testifying than that given to
other witnesses. 33
Protection against erroneous convictions
is also provided by legal standards that ac-
cord to the defendant the benefit of doubts as
to his guilt. The most substantial protection
of this type is the requirement that the state
establish guilt by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Supreme Court described the
reasonable doubt standard as the "prime
instrument [in the 'American scheme of
criminal procedure'] for reducing risk of
convictions resting on factual error"'34 and
characterized its "stringency" as operating
to "impose almost the entire risk of error"
upon the state.' 35 The requirement of a
unanimous jury verdict does not similarly
shift the burden to the state, as it applies to
Spring 1993
both acquittals and convictions. It does, however, provide
assurance that the state will have made its case fully when it gains
a conviction.'36
The defendant is given the benefit of the doubt in a less direct
fashion by other legal standards. The double jeopardy bar gives
absolute finality to an acquittal even where it appears to be based
on error. As the Supreme Court noted, "[t]o permit a second trial
after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been,
would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government,
with its vastly superior resources might wear down the defendant
so that 'even though innocent' he may be found guilty."'37
Further, in determining whether a trial error requires reversing a
conviction, appellate courts traditionally require a new trial
when there is a likelihood that the error affected the jury's
judgment, thus rejecting the position that a conviction should
stand if the jury's finding of guilt appears to be "correct,"
notwithstanding error.13
8
Like other goals in the criminal justice process, protection of
the accused from erroneous conviction has its limitations. The
prosecution's burden of persuasion is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, not a higher standard that requires absolute certainty in the
mind of the jurors. 39 Moreover, in many jurisdictions the burden
does not apply to some defenses or mitigating factors that do not
directly contradict the elements of the offense. 40 Similarly,
while eyewitness identification poses a recognized risk of mis-
take, convictions based upon such identifications are acceptable,
subject to limited restraints. 4' While "[r]ecognizing a real, if
slight, danger of false self-condemnation, we allow evidentiary
use of confessions, subject to constitutional safeguards."' 42
Minimizing the Burdens of Accusation and Litigation
Even if eventually acquitted, an inno-
cent person charged with a crime suffers
substantial burdens. The accusation casts
doubt on the person's reputation that is not
easily erased. As Judge Frank once noted:
"In the public mind, the blot on a man's
escutcheon, resulting from such a public
accusation, is seldom wiped out by a subse-
quent judgment of not guilty. Frequently,
the public remembers the accusation and
still suspects guilt even after an acquittal."' 43
Even if the public should accept an acquittal
as full vindication of the accused, other
burdens borne by a defendant in the course
of gaining that acquittal remain unaddressed.
Unless indigent, defendants must finance
their defense as successful defendants are
not entitled to reimbursement of expenses
"
[lit is "a fundamental
value determination
of our system.., that
it is far worse to
convict an innocent
person than let a
guilty man go free.
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upon acquittal. Perhaps more significant,
however, are costs that cannot be readily Because
measured in dollars. Once accused, a defen-
dant must await trial. This waiting period safe
brings with it a certain degree of anxiety and guard
insecurity that disrupts the daily flow of life.
This disruption is even greater if the accused lay juror j
is incarcerated pending trial. When the trial
actually occurs, the ordeal of litigation takes are direc
a further emotional toll.
In light of these substantial burdens,
criminal justice process concerned with the the excel
protection of the innocent cannot limit itself
to ensuring against erroneous convictions, the avai
It must also reduce, to an acceptable level,
the risk that accusations will be brought jury at th
against innocent persons. Because the bur-
dens of an accusation are not as great as the
burdens of erroneous conviction, the accept- election
able degree of risk is somewhat greater. It is
not necessary to limit accusations to cases in in met
which conviction is almost certain, for the
prosecution would then be deprived of many of the
otherwise valid convictions. Adequate pro-
tection against erroneous accusations does of/lay
require, however, that accusations be sup- pl
ported by sufficient evidence to produce a
substantial likelihood of conviction.
In limiting the number of erroneous accusations, the system
does not solve the problem of the accused who is appropriately
charged but later acquitted (and therefore viewed as possibly
innocent). Some defendants inevitably will fall in this category.
No matter how careful the screening, predicting the outcome of
litigation is too uncertain to avoid mistakes. While the system
cannot avoid imposing substantial litigation burdens on properly
accused defendants who are eventually acquitted, it can mini-
mize their burdens if such efforts are consistent with preserving
a practicable system of adjudication. Because the defendants
who fall in this category cannot be identified at the outset, the
system must minimize litigation burdens for all defendants,
including those who will be found guilty.
Minimizing the risk of erroneous accusations is achieved
through various screening procedures. Initially, the police
officer must have probable cause of guilt before taking a person
into custody for the purpose of charging him with a crime."4a
Moreover, the officer's probable cause determination is subject
to exparte screening by a magistrate, either in the issuance of an
arrest warrant or in the subsequent review of a warrantless
arrest. 4 5 In most jurisdictions, felony charges are subject to
par
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further review by a magistrate at an
zy of the adversarial preliminary hearing. 46 In manyjurisdictions, as an alternative or additional
bye felony screening procedure, a grand juryi y reviews the prosecution's evidence to deter-
mine whether it is sufficient to justify the
ticipation proposed indictment.' 7
The goal of eliminating unnecessary liti-
towards gation burdens is reflected in other rights of
the accused. Bail provisions seek to avoid
pretrial incarceration when there is an alter-
nal case, native means of reasonably assuring
defendant's presence at trial.'4 8 The
ility of a defendant's right to a speedy trial is de-
signed, in part, to limit the length of pretrial
fendant's incarceration (where bail is not available)
and to "minimize the anxiety and concern"
of the accused pending trial. 49 Venue re-
e critical quirements, in part, ensure that the defen-
dant will be tried in a convenient forum. 50
g most The double jeopardy prohibition, supple-
mented by joinder requirements, also re-
ectives duces litigation burdens by restricting the
use of multiple trials for closely related
cipation offenses. '5'
Providing Lay Participation
Another cornerstone of the American
criminaljustice process is the use of lay persons as decisionmakers.
Traditionally, lay participation was provided through the trial
jury, the grand jury, and lay magistrates. Today, the trial jury
stands alone as the only universally available source of lay
participation. While a substantial majority of states continue to
have some lay magistrates in their judiciaries, the bulk of the
criminal cases in those states come before lawyer-magistrates. 15 2
As for the grand jury, only nineteen states continue to require
grand jury participation (through a defense right to prosecution
by indictment) for all felony cases."'
Because dismissals and guilty pleas account for far more
dispositions than do trials, juries are often not used.5 4 Even when
a case proceeds to trial, many defendants elect to have bench
trials."55 The defendant, however, does have a right to ajury trial
in all jurisdictions on felony and serious misdemeanor charges.5 6
In most states, the prosecution also has an independent right to
insist upon a jury trial.'57 Because many of the safeguards
provided by lay juror participation are directed towards the
exceptional case, the availability of a jury at the defendant's
election is the critical feature in meeting most of the objectives
of lay participation.'58
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Lay juror participation in the criminal
justice process is designed to serve several The insik
distinct functions,'59 all of which reflect a
single underlying value judgment: the ad- respectfi
ministration of the criminal justice process
is too important to be left exclusively in the d1.igty
hands of government officials.
60 Unlike
judges or prosecutors, lay jurors are inde-
pendent from the government bureaucracy. in variol
As the Supreme Court noted, the framers of
the Constitution "knew from history and of the
experience" that it was necessary to provide
a safeguard through the petit jury, "againstJUStic
the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge . . . . Fear of unchecked power, so
typical of our State and Federal Govemment in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon
community participation in the determination of guilt or inno-
cence."'' The independence of the grandjury provides a similar
check against the misuse of executive authority in charging.'62
In addition to their independence, lay petit and grand jurors
offer advantages that stem from their lay perspective and their
representation of the community. Their position as community
representatives lends a special sense of legitimacy to the criminal
justice process, making unpopular decisions more readily ac-
ceptable to the general public. Lay jurors' community views
"bring to bear local conceptions of justice ... and adjust the
crude substantive criminal law to the circumstances of individual
cases."'6 3 Indeed, jurors may refuse to convict (or charge, in the
case of the grand jury) when they conclude that, notwithstanding
a proven violation, enforcement of the letter of the law would
result in a miscarriage of justice.
Vesting decisionmaking authority in lay jurors, "neither le-
gally trained nor routinely engaged in the administration of
criminal justice," arguably strengthens the factfinding capacity
of the process. 64 The jurors' "very inexperience is an asset
because it secures a fresh perception of each trial, avoiding the
stereotypes said to infect the judicial eye."'' 65
Although use of lay magistrates today is a necessary conse-
quence of resource limitations (allowing accessible local courts
in rural areas with too few lawyers to provide lawyer-magis-
trates), the lay magistrate originally was justified by reference to
basic values of lay participation.1 66 The lay magistrate was
assumed to be closer to the community views and therefore more
likely to reflect the community's sense of justice. Only the lay
magistrate could provide this perspective in "petty offense"
cases to which a right to jury trial was unavailable. 67 The
movement away from lay magistrates stems from concern that
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the advantages provided by their perspec-
ce upon tive are diluted by the bureaucratization of
the magistrate's position within the judicial
ndividual hierarchy and are offset by the typical
magistrate's lack of familiarity with, or lack
eflected of inclination to take seriously, thedefendant's basic legal rights.'68
'lements Respecting the Dignity of the Individual
Another foundational process objective
minal is to ensure that criminal justice administra-
tion is consistent with respect for the indi-
vidual dignity. The concept of human dig-
nity, as used in this context, is far from
precise. It roughly encompasses the basic
needs of the human personality, including
privacy, autonomy, and freedom from humiliation and abuse.'69
Requiring that criminal justice practices respect human dig-
nity is justified on several grounds. First, all persons, including
criminals, are entitled to governmental respect for their dignity
as an inherent element of the social compact which provides the
foundation for a democratic society. 7 Second, in light of the
combination of the "severity of the sanctions administered by the
criminal law," the "status-degrading potency of criminal pro-
ceedings," and the "community outrage" that tempts officials to
solve crime at all costs, the preservation of human dignity is the
sine qua non for maintaining a society that respects individual
liberty and adheres to the rule of law.' 7' As the Supreme Court
noted:
When society acts to deprive one of its members of his life,
liberty or property, it takes its most awesome steps. No
general respect for, nor adherence to, the law as a whole
can well be expected without judicial recognition of the
paramount need for prompt, eminently fair, and sober
criminal law procedures. The methods we employ in the
enforcement of our criminal law have aptly been called the
measures by which the quality of our civilization may be
judged.'72
Finally, ensuring respect for individual dignity is essential in
obtaining public acceptance of the process and to promote
respect for the law.'73
The insistence upon respect for individual dignity is reflected
in various elements of the criminal justice process. Many
procedural requirements that implement other cornerstone ob-
jectives also serve this goal. Thus, requirements promoting an
adversarial adjudicatory system recognize individual dignity by
giving the defendant an element of control over his own de-
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fense. 17 4 Similarly, the Supreme Court described the privilege
against self-incrimination as based on "our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality.'
75
Other legal requirements are devoted entirely to ensuring
respect for human dignity. The Eighth Amendment bars cruel
and unusual punishment which reduces individual honor and
dignity. 176 Insofar as the double jeopardy prohibition provides
for the repose of the convicted defendant (rather than safeguard-
ing against erroneous convictions), it also focuses on limiting the
oppression to which the guilty can be subjected.'77 The Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures guarantees respect for another aspect of human dignity, the
privacy of the individual. It does, however, permit government
officials to invade that privacy upon a demonstration of suffi-
cient need and grounding. 7 1 Many common law standards, such
as the privilege for marital communications, recognize the
essential needs of the human personality. 7 9
Legal restrictions aimed at ensuring respect for individual
dignity tend to be more truth-deflecting than standards serving
other objectives of the criminal justice process. Typically, such
restrictions prevent prosecutors from obtaining probative evi-
dence that could establish guilt. The impact of that loss often is
unclear because the evidence is not obtained. The loss is
crystallized, however, when incriminating evidence otherwise
establishing the defendant's guilt is held inadmissible, and the
prosecution is lost. By disallowing the use of such incriminating
evidence, the criminal justice process uses
the criminal prosecution itself to vindicate
the prohibition that was violated. A positiv
The use of prosecutorial presentation as
the appropriate forum for vindication, rather t
than imposing sanctions directly upon the Of
governmental agents who violated the re-
strictions, is accepted in some applications justice
and highly controversial in others. Perhaps
the most controversial application is the soughttI
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment search and sei-
zure provisions. The basic premise underly- stand
ing this remedy was stated aptly by Abraham
Goldstein: guaranth
Justice to society is sometimes taken to of the p
require that a given case be used not only
to deal with the situation immediately
before the court but also to serve a larger preclude
public interest. In criminal cases, the
accused may get relief, not so much out of ofpos,
concern for him or for the "truth," but
because he is strategically located, and motivated, to call
the attention of the courts to excesses in the administration
of criminal justice. The underlying premise is that of a
social utilitarianism. If the criminal goes free in order to
serve a larger and more important end, then social justice
is done, even if individual justice is not. 80
Maintaining the Appearance of Fairness
The criminal justice process seeks not only to provide fair
procedures, but also to maintain the appearance of fairness in
applying its procedures. As the Supreme Court noted, "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice."'' The fact that criminal
justice procedures are fair is not sufficient; the procedures must
also be perceived as fair (and as fairly administered) by both its
participants and the public.
The appearance of fairness is essential to the effectiveness of
process. Initially, it is vital to maintain public confidence in the
process.82 Because three of the primary administrators of the
process, the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel, are
all members of the same profession, there may be a tendency on
the part of outsiders to view the process with some suspicion.
This suspicion can be offset by ensuring that the process and its
decisions are open to public review. 83 These factors also may
help reconcile the losing defendant to his fate. Even though he
may disagree with the result, he knows who made the decision
and how it was reached.'84 Finally, the appearance of fairness,
particularly as it relates to the trial stage, is
necessary to fulfill what commentators have
erception characterized as the "symbolic function" of
the trial. 8 5 That function is described as
providing a "series of object lessons and
minal examples" through which "society is trained
in right ways of thought and action, not by)cess is compulsion, but by parables which it inter-
prets and follows voluntarily."'86
igh legal A positive perception of the criminaljustice process is sought through legal stan-
dards that guarantee the openness of the
!S that process and preclude suggestions of pos-
sible bias. Those designed to ensure the
Ppenness openness of the process include constitu-
tional and statutory standards that guaran-
ess and tee public access to the trial and pretrial
proceedings.'87 Openness is also provided
by statutes and common law doctrines al-gestions lowing public inspection of documents and
records relating to an even broader range of
e bias. proceedings.'88
Legal standards to eliminate suggestions
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of bias include several that provide relief for the mere possibility
of prejudice (rather than proof of actual prejudice). 8 9 One such
standard, for example, requires automatic reversal of a convic-
tion when a judge may have had financial or personal interest in
the outcome of his decision, without inquiry as to whether that
interest actually produced a biased decision.1 9 At times, the
process' interest in ensuring an appearance of fairness will
prevail over the defendant's desire to forego a particular proce-
dural right. Some jurisdictions require the defendant to be
present at trial even though he would prefer to be tried in
absentia. 9'
Achieving Equality in the Application of the Process
In a society dedicated to achieving "equal justice under law,"
it is natural that another goal of the criminal justice process is to
achieve equality in its administration. The primary concern is
that each jurisdiction be evenhanded in its treatment of defen-
dants. Accordingly, while procedures need not be applied in the
same way to all defendants, similarly-situated defendants must
be treated alike. 192 In other words, distinc-
tions drawn between defendants must be
based on grounds that are properly related to When pJ
the process' functions.
A proper basis for disparate treatment of
defendants varies with each case. In deter- analysis is
mining whether to press charges, for ex-
ample, a prosecutor could rationally draw starting p
distinctions based on a variety of factors
(such as differences in the defendants' past--enti"yn-
records) that would have no bearing in deter-
mining which defendant will receive six-
person rather than twelve-person juries. As principle
a result, where a broad range of relevant
factors are likely to produce legitimate con- ing their r
siderable disparity from one case to another,
the process tends to provide extensive dis-
cretion to the decisionmaker. When the
procedural step should result in roughly simi-
lar treatment for all, the decisionmaker's core proc
authority to draw distinctions is more nar-
rowly proscribed. The range of permissible of pr
considerations is not unlimited, however,
even in those areas where extensive discre- effective
tion is granted. Certain factors such as race,
ethnicity, and religion are viewed as im-
proper grounds for discrimination through- of the s
out the process.'93 Indigency may also fall
within this category, although the state's crimi
obligation to the indigent falls short of pro-
Spring 1993
viding him with precisely the same assistance available to a non-
indigent defendant.'94
A wide range of limited laws prohibit improper discrimina-
tion. The primary provision barring discrimination is the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 95 Other consti-
tutional guarantees, such as the Sixth Amendment's counsel and
jury requirements, bar certain types of discrimination.'96 Statu-
tory provisions often extend beyond constitutional guarantees to
reduce the discriminatory impact of the process. 9 ' Thus, statu-
tory provisions reduce the heavier burden of indigent defendants
by both providing them with greater assistance than constitution-
ally required and restricting reliance upon procedures more
likely to be unavailable to the poor.' The recent movement to
limit judicial sentencing discretion also reflects an interest in
reducing a type of discrimination (that based upon differences in
the sentencing philosophies of individual judges) that is not
barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. 199
THE VALUE OF CORNERSTONE ANALYSIS
Public policy analysis often must take a
back seat for a court that must decide whether
a particular legal standard is legally man-
dated. Statutory or constitutional language,
legislative history, or precedent often clearly
provides an answer so as to minimize the
need for such analysis. At times, however,
the court needs to look to the basic policies
that shape the process. For the legislator, the
high court considering the adoption of a
court rule, and the delegate to a state consti-
tutional convention, public policy analysis
will more frequently be critical, as the law-
maker here commonly possesses greater free-
dom in establishing new standards or reject-
ing old standards.
Where public policy analysis is required,
the starting point should be identifying cor-
nerstone principles and assessing their rela-
tionship to the core process function of pro-
moting effective enforcement of the sub-
stantial criminal law. That is the task at-
tempted here. Others may find additional or
somewhat differently defined cornerstone
objectives. They may see differently the
possible relationships between those objec-
tives and achievement of effective enforce-
ment. In any case, the process of identifica-
tion and articulation should help the law-
maker in providing a basic framework for
F21
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the analysis of the role of a particular legal requirement. While important first step.
that may be only the beginning of the lawmaker's task, it is a very
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59. This commonly includes questioning the defendant, who
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65. The Supreme Court has placed special emphasis upon this
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109. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Chambers
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112. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 484 n.12 (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2511, at 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
113. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) ("There is always
in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding
.... Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value--as a criminal defendant in his liberty--this margin of error
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116. See Watts 338 U.S. at 54 (Frankfurter, J.) ("Under our
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York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Winship
Redux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX. L. REV. 109 (1990).
119. Medina v. California 112 S. Ct. 2572,2577 (1992); LAFAVE
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in THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1, at 8 (National College
of District Attorneys 1977) (Defendant's constitutional right to
proceed pro se, as recognized in Faretta, 422 U.S. 806, repre-
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see Stacy, supra note 49 (questioning whether the Court has
actually given a higher priority to this concern.)
128. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 214 (1988) (quoting Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
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Schwartz, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1989).
141. Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identifi-
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148. Id. § 12.1. Danger to the community may also be consid-
ered in determining whether release pending trial is appropriate.
Id. §§ 12.3, 18.1(b).
149. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
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protection of "individual interests," such as "privacy" and "au-
tonomy" are "clearly shared even by citizens who are 'guilty"');
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